Is intending just remembering?

Mind & Language, 2026

I assess Wayne Wu’s thesis that intention is a form of practical memory functionally analogous to working memory. Wu argues that being active in intention involves vigilance and steadfastness (sustaining attention). I argue that being active in intention also requires strategic management, a distinct process of modulating intention’s influence against other sources of bias like habit or emotion. I argue this strategic management (which relies on a particular form of practical reasoning I identify as meta-reasoning) is not reducible to Wu’s concepts of steadfastness or fine-tuning, and conclude that an agent’s activeness in intention involves more than the memory-like functions Wu identifies.

An AI-powered research assistant in the lab: A practical guide for text analysis through iterative collaboration with LLMs

With Gino Carmona-Díaz, William Jiménez-Leal, María Alejandra Grisales, Chandra Sripada, Santiago Amaya, and Michael Inzlicht

Behavior Research Methods, 2026

Analyzing texts such as open-ended responses, headlines, or social media posts is a time- and labor-intensive process highly susceptible to bias. However, large language models (LLMs) are promising tools for text analysis, using either a predefined (top-down) or a data-driven (bottom-up) taxonomy, without sacrificing quality. Here, we present a step-by-step tutorial to efficiently develop, test, and apply taxonomies for analyzing unstructured data through an iterative and collaborative process between researchers and an LLM. Using personal goals provided by participants as an example, we demonstrate how we used this method to write prompts to review datasets and generate a taxonomy of life domains, evaluate and refine the taxonomy through prompt and direct modifications, and apply the taxonomy to categorize an entire dataset with high intercoder reliability, while achieving high levels of human–LLM intercoder agreement, reducing analysis time by approximately 87.5%. This test offers a proof of concept, suggesting that with the right procedures LLMs can be used to generate reliable bottom-up categorizations. We discuss the possibilities and limitations of using LLMs for text analysis.

Autonomy by Design: Preserving Human Autonomy in AI Decision-Support

With Stefan Buijsman and Sarah E. Carter

Philosophy & Technology, 2025

AI systems increasingly support human decision-making across domains of professional, skill-based, and personal activity. While previous work has examined how AI might affect human autonomy globally, the effects of AI on domain-specific autonomy—the capacity for self-governed action within defined realms of skill or expertise—remain understudied. We analyze how AI decision-support systems affect two key components of domain-specific autonomy: skilled competence (the ability to make informed judgments within one’s domain) and authentic value-formation (the capacity to form genuine domain-relevant values and preferences). By engaging with prior investigations and analyzing empirical cases across medical, financial, and educational domains, we demonstrate how the absence of reliable failure indicators and the potential for unconscious value shifts can erode domain-specific autonomy both immediately and over time. We then develop a constructive framework for autonomy-preserving AI support systems. We propose specific socio-technical design patterns—including careful role specification, implementation of defeater mechanisms, and support for reflective practice—that can help maintain domain-specific autonomy while leveraging AI capabilities. This framework provides concrete guidance for developing AI systems that enhance rather than diminish human agency within specialized domains of action.

➤ Comments on this paper from Reuben Sass (our reply) and Ron Aboodi (our reply)

What is the Feeling of Effort About?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2025

For agents like us, the feeling of effort is a very useful thing. It helps us sense how hard an action is, control its level of intensity, and decide whether to continue or stop performing it. While there has been progress in understanding the feeling of mental effort and the feeling of bodily effort, this has not translated into a unified account of the general feeling of effort. To advance in this direction, I defend the single-feeling view, which states that the feeling of effort is one and the same for both mental and bodily actions. This feeling represents the subjective costs, both mental and physical, of performing a given action. Cost-based approaches have recently become influential for the feeling of mental effort. Here I focus on arguing that our sense of bodily effort does not simply represent physiological processes, but rather represents the subjective costs of a bodily action. Through this paper I discuss the role of the feeling of effort (and affective states more broadly) in action guidance and the sense of agency. I also define efforts themselves in terms of the feeling of effort.

Temptation and Apathy

With S. Berthelette, G. Fernández, A. Anaya, and D. Rodríguez

Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, 2024

Self-control is deemed crucial for reasons-responsive agency and a key contributor to long-term wellbeing. But recent studies suggest that effortfully resisting one’s temptations does not contribute to long-term goal attainment, and can even be harmful. So how does self-control improve our lives? Finding an answer requires revising the role that overcoming temptation plays in self-control. This paper distinguishes two forms of self-control problems: temptation (the presence of a strong wayward motivation) and apathy (the lack of commitment-advancing motivation). This distinction makes it possible to separate negative self-control (aimed at overcoming temptation) from positive self-control (aimed at overcoming lack of motivation). The paper argues that temptation should not play a central role in our conception of self-control, since overcoming temptation is neither necessary nor sufficient for successful self-control.

The whole is larger than the sum of its parts: additive effects of SMS nudge bundles

With S. Barbosa

Frontiers in Communication, 2024

Public access to housing is a challenge for a large number of societies and follows a great number of limitations. Here, we test several SMS-interventions aiming at motivating people to get information on affordable loans for housing options actually available to them. We randomly assigned 6,247 people to receive an SMS inviting them to get information about government backed housing loans for which they were already eligible. SMSs followed one of 14 possible nudges including “simple” nudges (e.g., messages personalized with the recipient’s name or mentioning a social norm) and “bundled” nudges (combining personalization with another simple nudge). We observed SMS response rates (i.e., responding to sign up for receiving more information) according to which nudge was assigned. No other independent variable was considered. While most nudges were more effective than a control SMS, we observed significant variation across nudges on their ability to elicit responses from users. Combinations of multiple nudges were more successful in behavior elicitation than simple nudges. We discuss the possible implications of “single” or “bundled” SMS on response rates and as an effective tool of behavior change.

Believe in Your Self-Control: Lay Theories of Self-Control and their Downstream Effects

With Samuel Murray

Current Opinion in Psychology, 2024

Self-control is the ability to inhibit temptations and persist in one’s decisions about what to do. In this article, we review recent evidence that suggests implicit beliefs about the process of self-control influence how the process operates. While earlier work focused on the moderating influence of willpower beliefs on depletion effects, we survey new directions in the field that emphasize how beliefs about the nature of self-control, self-control strategies, and their effectiveness have effects on downstream regulation and judgment. These new directions highlight the need to better understand the role of self-control beliefs in naturalistic decision-making.

What is a subliminal technique? An ethical perspective on AI-driven influence

With Rune Nyrup, Sebastian Deterding, Celine Mougenot, Laura Moradbakhti, Fangzhou You, and Rafael A. Calvo

IEEE ETHICS-2023 Conference Proceedings

➤ See also our op-ed on the topic at Euractiv

Concerns about threats to human autonomy feature prominently in many statements on AI ethics. One aspect of this involves the use of AI systems for problematically manipulative influence. In response to this, the European Union’s draft AI Act (AIA) includes a prohibition on AI systems that use subliminal techniques that alter people’s behavior in ways that are reasonably likely to cause harm (Article 5(1)(a)). Critics have argued that the term ‘subliminal techniques’ is too narrow to capture the target cases of AI-based manipulation. We propose a definition of ‘subliminal techniques’ that (a) is grounded on a plausible interpretation of the legal text; (b) addresses all or most of the underlying ethical concerns motivating the prohibition; (c) is defensible from a scientific and philosophical perspective; and (d) does not over-reach in ways that impose excessive administrative and regulatory burdens. The definition is meant to provide guidance for design teams seeking to pursue responsible and ethically aligned AI innovation.

Efforts and their Feelings

With Olivier Massin

Philosophy Compass, 2023

Effort and the feeling of effort play important roles in many theoretical discussions, from perception to self-control and free will, from the nature of ownership to the nature of desert and achievement. A crucial, overlooked distinction within the philosophical and scientific literatures is the distinction between theories that seek to explain effort and theories that seek to explain the feeling of effort. Lacking a clear distinction between these two phenomena makes the literature hard to navigate. To advance in the unification and development of this area, this article provides an overview of the main theories of the nature of effort and the nature of the feeling of effort, and then discusses how efforts and their feelings are related. Two key takeaways emerge. First, there is widespread agreement that efforts are goal-directed actions. Second, one of the main philosophical issues to be decided is whether feelings of effort should be defined by reference to efforts (effort-first approach), or whether efforts are defined by reference to the feeling of effort (feeling-first approach).

Moralization and self-control strategy selection

With Samuel Murray and Felipe De Brigard

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 2023

To manage conflicts between temptation and commitment, people use self-control. The process model of self-control outlines different strategies for managing the onset and experience of temptation. However, little is known about the decision-making factors underlying strategy selection. Across three experiments (N = 317), we tested whether the moral valence of a commitment predicts how people advise attentional self-control strategies. In Experiments 1 and 2, people rated attentional focus strategies as significantly more effective for people tempted to break moral relative to immoral commitments, even when controlling for perceived temptation and trait self-control. Experiment 3 showed that as people perceived commitments to have more positive moral valence, they judged attentional focus strategies to be significantly more effective relative to attentional distraction strategies. Moreover, this effect was partly mediated by perceived differences in motivation. These results indicate that moralization informs decision-making processes related to self-control strategy selection.

What’s inside is all that counts? The contours of everyday thinking about self-control

With Sam Murray, Louis Chartrand, & Sergio Barbosa

Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2023

Does self-control require willpower? The question cuts to the heart of a debate about whether self-control is identical with some psychological process internal to the agents or not. Noticeably absent from these debates is systematic evidence about the folk-psychological category of self-control. Here, we present the results of two behavioral studies (N = 296) that indicate the structure of everyday thinking about self-control. In Study 1, participants rated the degree to which different strategies to respond to motivational conflict exemplify self-control. Participants distinguished between intra-psychic and externally-scaffolded strategies and judged that the former exemplified self-control more than the latter. In Study 2, participants provided various solutions to manage motivational conflict and rated their proposals on effectiveness. Participants produced substantially more intra-psychic strategies, rated them as more effective, and advised them at a higher rate than externally-scaffolded strategies. Taken together, these results suggest that while people recognize a plurality of strategies as genuine instances of self-control, purely internal exercises of self-control are considered more prototypical than their externally-scaffolded counterparts. This implies a hierarchical structure for the folk psychological category of self-control. The concept encompasses a variety of regulatory strategies and organizes these strategies along a hierarchical continuum, with purely intra-psychic strategies at the center and scaffolded strategies in the periphery.

Will-powered: Synchronic regulation is the difference maker for self-control

With Zac Irving, Jordan Bridges, Aaron Glasser, and Chandra Sripada

Cognition, 2022

Philosophers, psychologists, and economists have reached the consensus that one can use two different kinds of regulation to achieve self-control. Synchronic regulation uses willpower to resist current temptation. Diachronic regulation implements a plan to avoid future temptation. Yet this consensus may rest on contaminated intuitions. Specifically, agents typically use willpower (synchronic regulation) to achieve their plans to avoid temptation (diachronic regulation). So even if cases of diachronic regulation seem to involve self-control, this may be because they are contaminated by synchronic regulation. We therefore developed a novel multifactorial method to disentangle synchronic and diachronic regulation. Using this method, we find that ordinary usage assumes that only synchronic––not diachronic––regulation counts as self-control. We find this pattern across four experiments involving different kinds of temptation, as well as a paradigmatic case of diachronic regulation based on the classic story of Odysseus and the Sirens. Our final experiment finds that self-control in a diachronic case depends on whether the agent uses synchronic regulation at two moments: when she (1) initiates and (2) follows-through on a plan to resist temptation. Taken together, our results strongly suggest that synchronic regulation is the sole difference maker in the folk concept of self-control.

The skill of self-control

Synthese, 2021

Researchers often claim that self-control is a skill. It is also often stated that self-control exertions are intentional actions. However, no account has yet been proposed of the skillful agency that makes self-control exertion possible, so our understanding of self-control remains incomplete. Here I propose the skill model of self-control, which accounts for skillful agency by tackling the guidance problem: how can agents transform their abstract and coarse-grained intentions into the highly context-sensitive, fine-grained control processes required to select, revise and correct strategies during self-control exertion? The skill model borrows conceptual tools from ‘hierarchical models’ recently developed in the context of motor skills, and asserts that self-control crucially involves the ability to manage the implementation and monitoring of regulatory strategies as the self-control exercise unfolds. Skilled agents are able do this by means of flexible practical reasoning: a fast, context-sensitive type of deliberation that incorporates non-propositional representations (including feedback signals about strategy implementation, such as the feeling of mental effort) into the formation and revision of the mixed-format intentions that structure self-control exertion. The literatures on implementation intentions and motivation framing offer corroborating evidence for the theory. As a surprising result, the skill of self-control that allows agents to overcome the contrary motivations they experience is self-effacing: instead of continuously honing this skill, expert agents replace it with a different one, which minimizes or prevents contrary motivations from arising in the first place. Thus, the more expert someone is at self-control, the less likely they are to use it.

Intentional mind-wandering as intentional omission: The surrealist method

with Santiago Arango

Synthese, 2021

Mind-wandering seems to be paradigmatically unintentional. However, experimental findings have yielded the paradoxical result that mind-wandering can also be intentional. In this paper, we first present the paradox of intentional mind-wandering and then explain intentional mind-wandering as the intentional omission to control one’s own thoughts. Finally, we present the surrealist method for artistic production to illustrate how intentional omission to control thoughts can be deployed towards creative endeavours.

Willpower needs tactical skill

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2021

In “Willpower with and without effort”, G. Ainslie advances our understanding of self-control by theoretically unifying multiple forms of willpower. But one crucial question remains unanswered: How do agents pick the right forms of willpower in each situation? I argue that willpower requires tactical skill, which detects willpower-demanding contexts, selects context-appropriate tactics, and monitors their implementation. Research on tactical skill will significantly advance our understanding of willpower.

Perceiving utilitarian gradients: Heart rate variability and self-regulatory effort in the moral dilemma task

With Alejandro Rosas, Jorge Martínez Cotrina, David Aguilar-Pardo, Juan Carlos Caicedo Mera, and Diego Mauricio Aponte

Social Neuroscience, 2021

It is not yet clear which response behavior requires self-regulatory effort in the moral dilemma task. Previous research has proposed that utilitarian responses require cognitive control, but subsequent studies have found inconsistencies with the empirical predictions of that hypothesis. In this paper we treat participants’ sensitivity to utilitarian gradients as a measure of performance. We confronted participants (N = 82) with a set of five dilemmas evoking a gradient of mean utilitarian responses in a 4-point scale and collected data on heart rate variability and on utilitarian responses. We found positive correlations between tonic and phasic HRV and sensitivity to the utilitarian gradient in the high tonic group, but not in the low tonic group. Moreover, the low tonic group misplaced a scenario with a selfish incentive at the high end of the gradient. Results suggest that performance is represented by sensitivity correlated with HRV and accompanied with a reasonable placement of individual scenarios within the gradient.

Is a bad will a weak will? Cognitive dispositions modulate folk attributions of weakness of will

With Alejandro Rosas & Antonio Gutiérrez

Philosophical Explorations, 2018

In line with recent efforts to empirically study the folk concept of weakness of will, we examine two issues in this paper: (1) How is weakness of will attribution [WWA] influenced by an agent’s violations of best judgment and/or resolution, and by the moral valence of the agent’s action? (2) Do any of these influences depend on the cognitive dispositions of the judging individual? We implemented a factorial 2x2x2 between–subjects design with judgment violation, resolution violation, and action valence as independent variables, and measured participants’ cognitive dispositions using Frederick’s Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT]. We conclude that intuitive and reflective individuals have two different concepts of weakness of will. The study supports this claim by showing that: a) the WWA of intuitive subjects is influenced by the action’s (and probably also the commitment’s) moral valence, while the WWA of reflective subjects is not; b) judgment violation plays a small role in the WWA of intuitive subjects, while reflective subjects treat resolution violation as the only relevant trait. Data were collected among students at two different universities. All subjects (N=710) answered the CRT. A three-way ANOVA was first conducted on the whole sample and then on the intuitive and reflective groups separately. This study suggests that differences in cognitive dispositions can significantly impact the folk understanding of philosophical concepts, and thus suggests that analysis of folk concepts should take cognitive dispositions into account.

Do we reflect while performing skillful actions?

Philosophical Psychology, 2017

From our everyday commuting to the gold medalist’s world-class performance, skillful actions are characterized by fine-grained, online agentive control. What is the proper explanation of such control? There are two traditional candidates: intellectualism explains skillful agentive control by reference to the agent’s propositional mental states; anti-intellectualism holds that propositional mental states or reflective processes are unnecessary since skillful action is fully accounted for by automatic coping processes. I examine the evidence for three psychological phenomena recently held to support anti-intellectualism and argue that it supports neither traditional candidate, but an intermediate attention-control account, according to which the top-down, intention-directed control of attention is a necessary component of skillful action. Only this account recognizes both the role of automatic control in skilled action and the need for higher-order cognition to thread automatic processes together into a unified, skillful performance. This applies to bodily skillful action in general, from the world-class performance of experts to mundane, habitual action. The attention-control account stresses that, for intentions to play their role as top-down modulators of attention, agents must sustain the intention’s activation; hence, the need for reflecting throughout performance.

See a video presentation of the paper here.

The Philosophy of Effort

Special issue for the journal Synthese, edited with Malte Hendrickx and Olivier Massin.

Habitual Action, Automaticity, and Control

Special issue for the journal Topoi, edited with Flavia Felletti.

Remembering as a mental action — with Santiago Arango

New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory (Routledge, 2017)

Many philosophers consider that memory is just a passive information retention and retrieval capacity. Some information and experiences are encoded, stored, and subsequently retrieved in a passive way, without any control or intervention on the subject’s part. In this paper, we will defend an active account of memory according to which remembering is a mental action and not merely a passive mental event. According to the reconstructive account, memory is an imaginative reconstruction of past experience. A key feature of the reconstructive account is that given the imperfect character of memory outputs, some kind of control is needed. Metacognition is the control of mental processes and dispositions. Drawing from recent work on the normativity of automaticity and automatic control, we distinguish two kinds of metacognitive control: top-down, reflective control, on the one hand, and automatic, intuitive, feeling-based control on the other. Thus, we propose that whenever the mental process of remembering is controlled by means of intuitive or feeling-based metacognitive processes, it is an action.

See a video presentation of the paper here.

Social media and self-control

Social Media and Your Brain (Praeger, 2016)

Self-control, the capacity to resist temptations and pursue longer-term goals over immediate gratifications, is crucial in determining the overall shape of our lives, and thereby in our ability to shape our identities. As it turns out, this capacity is intimately linked with our ability to control the direction of our attention. This raises the worry that perhaps social media are making us more easily distracted people, and therefore less able to exercise self-control. Is this so? And is it necessarily a bad thing? This paper analyzes the nature of attention, its vices and virtues, and what currently available evidence has to say about the effects of social media on attention and self-control. The pattern that seems to be emerging is that, although there is an association between higher use of social media and lower attentional control, we do not yet know whether it is social media use that makes people more distracted, or whether those who use social media the most do so because they are more easily distracted. Either way, the rise of the ‘Web 2.0’ does raise questions about whether the virtues of attention will change in the future, and whether this will bring with it a transformation in the way we shape our selves.

A taxonomy of algorithmic mental harms

Two guidelines for autonomy-supportive AI systems

AI-based nudging and the alignment problem

The poverty/self-control link: Lessons for the principles of practical rationality

Habits, not passions, are the targets of self-control